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Introduction
This paper is a preliminary report on citizens’ understanding and 
perceptions of democracy in Sri Lanka, as refl ected in a survey carried 
out in 2004-2005. The survey was a part of a South Asian study covering 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka on the theme “State of 
Democracy and Human Security in South Asia.” The report of the overall 
study has now been published as State of Democracy in South Asia: A 
Report (2008). 
In terms of methodology, the Study had four methodological 
‘pathways’. They are (i) case studies, (ii) dialogues, (iii) qualitative 
assessments, and (iv) cross- section surveys. The cross section survey 
carried out in each country was the principal instrument of data collection 
for the study. It sought to elicit broad trends of people’s opinions, attitudes 
and behaviour in relation to democracy. The other three pathways 
provided qualitative assessments and dimensions that were not captured 
in the cross-section survey. The pathway of ‘Dialogues’ was chosen in 
order to recognise and retrieve bodies and voices of critical knowledge 
that are available among different social and political constituencies. 
Under the component ‘Qualitative Assessments,’ scholars active in social 
science research were asked to ‘assess’ the experience of democracy in 
a non-partisan basis. The qualitative assessments addressed questions 
formulated around fi ve key themes: (i) the promise of democracy, (ii) design 
of democracy, (iii) working of democracy, (iv) democracy’s outcomes, and 
(v) democracy’s futures.       
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This essay has two components. In the fi rst, a brief account is 
given on the general observations and conclusions of the overall South 
Asian study as presented in the published Report (SDSA Report:2008). 
This account provides a broad context for the main fi ndings of the cross-
section survey in Sri Lanka. In presenting this brief South Asian account, 
we use the formulations of the Report with minor paraphrasing and 
alterations, without marking them as quotations. In the second part, some 
key fi ndings from Sri Lanka’s cross-section survey are presented. These 
observations are organised in the following thematic framework: meaning 
of democracy, alternatives to democracy, satisfaction with democracy and 
effi cacy of democracy. In this paper, we present only broad generalisations 
that constitute a general picture of Sri Lankan citizens’ encounters, 
perceptions and assessments of democracy. We intend to further explore 
these fi ndings in depth in future, linking them to the fi ndings of the 
qualitative components of the overall study. 
Part I
South Asia Report: Key ideas
In the Report of the overall study published in 2008, “seven big 
ideas” were highlighted (SDSA Report 2008:6-7). The following is a summary 
of them.
(i).  The idea of democracy has transformed South Asia as much as 
South Asia has transformed the idea of democracy. On one hand, 
the language, the practice and the institutions of democracy have 
transformed the popular common sense, everyday practices and 
relations of power. On the other hand, South Asia has re-worked the 
idea of democracy by infusing it with meanings that spill over the 
received frame of the idea of democracy.
(ii). South Asia disproves the notion that democracy cannot be instituted 
in conditions of mass poverty and illiteracy. It also goes against the 
expectation that democracy can be trusted to deliver development, 
security or human dignity.
(iii). Politics is central to the present and future of democracy in the region. 
Political organisations, that is, political parties as well as non-party 
political formations, continue to attract high degree of popular interest 
and involvement. They have the capacity not only to shape partisan 
loyalties and ideologies, but also social identities and economic 
interest.
(iv). People’ orientations to democracy are shaped principally by political 
experience, rather than by their inherited identities. For example, 
religion by itself matters much less than the national political context 
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in determining people’s orientation to democracy, security and well-
being. Political learning, by way of formal education, media exposure 
and experience of democracy, matters much more than any other factor 
in enhancing support for, trust in, and satisfaction with democracy.
(v).  The strength of the practice of democracy in South Asia lies in its 
capacity to move away from the received model of democracy. These 
disjunctures are not a source of slippage or failure, distortion or 
deviation, but a source of innovation.
(vi).  The encounter between South Asian cultures of democracy and 
the largely imported institutions has resulted in a bifurcation of 
institutions. For example, there are institutions that meet all the 
formal requirements of democracy, but lack in substance and 
vibrancy. On the other hand, there are institutions that connect with 
the people better, but have no formal democratic sanctity. Linkages 
between these two dimensions hold the key to the successful working 
of democracy.
(vii). There is a mismatch between ‘subjective’ and seemingly ‘objective’ 
dimensions of the working of democracy in South Asia. People’s self-
understanding in relation to democracy does not match their class 
ranking. Similarly, popular perceptions do not fi t in with ‘objective’ 
economic data or expert perceptions, or even activist assessments 
of democratic experience and institutions. This interplay between 
subjective and objective dimensions, and of lay (popular) and expert 
view, is an important element in democratic politics. It allows space 
for democratic negotiation as well as subversion.   
Democracy Survey: Major observations
In the analysis of the South Asia wide democracy study, the Report 
presents its key observations under eleven major themes. A summary of 
them under eight thematic headings is given below:
Aspiration for democracy: The support for democracy is fairly 
widespread across south Asia while very few doubt the suitability of 
democracy for their own country. Democracy is preferred over dictatorship 
everywhere except Pakistan. Meanwhile, affi rmation of representative 
democracy is more widespread in South Asia than the negation of its 
alternatives. In terms of people’s commitment to democracy, ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ democrats together outnumber the ‘non-democrats.’ At the same 
time, the support for democratic government is linked to the people’s 
experience with democracy, exposure to democracy and education. 
Interestingly, education and economic position are signifi cant in the 
support for democracy in South Asia. The higher the education, the 
higher is the support for democracy. South Asian elites are more fi rm in 
supporting democracy than the masses. There is also a noticeable gender 
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gap in the support for democracy. More men are supporters of democracy 
than women. Among the strong supporters of democracy in South Asia are 
ethnic minorities, despite the general view that ethnic minorities are yet 
to benefi t from democracy. In Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh, ethnic 
minorities are more supportive of democracy than the majority. In India 
and Nepal, the minority-majority divide does not matter in supporting 
democracy.
Meanings of democracy: South Asians seem to have grafted onto 
the global ideal of democracy their own meanings.  In South Asia, there is a 
greater emphasis on the substantive promise of democracy than some of the 
procedural aspects of democracy that are so central to the Western, liberal 
conception. The idea of democracy traveled to South Asia from Europe. 
Irrespective of the route through which it traveled, the idea of democracy in 
South Asia has over time become a part of the political commonsense. The 
vocabulary of democracy is routinely used for evaluating and critiquing 
political leadership. Though initially confi ned to a tiny English-speaking 
elite in all the South Asian countries, the cultures of democracy have 
since spread, though unevenly, to the mass publics. Thus, an imported 
concept of democracy has been adapted and assimilated into the cultures 
of democracy in South Asia.
It is against this backdrop that the meaning of democracy has been 
re-worked in South Asia. Among the multiple meanings people attribute to 
democracy, as revealed in the Survey are freedom, justice and welfare, 
popular rule, elections and political parties, peace and security, and the 
rule of law. Among the most essential attributes of democracy, the majority 
of South Asians give priority to the capacity of the polity to provide the basic 
necessities. The two most essential attributes of democracy, as preferred 
by 76% of South Asians, are basic necessities and equal rights. Compared 
with Africa and East Asia, the South Asian meaning of democracy puts 
more emphasis on equality and justice. People also have anxieties about 
democracy. Corruption is the principal anxiety, and the most disliked 
aspect of democracy for the South Asian citizens.
From design to promise: The various constitutional designs that 
embody the South Asian idea of democracy in different countries in the 
region refl ect a rupture between the promise and design of democracy. 
In fact, the constitutional designs do not fully embody the promise of 
democracy. For example, even where equal citizenship rights are available 
in theory and law, they cannot be enjoyed in full measure. In all countries, 
constitutional provisions for accountability and autonomy have suffered 
erosion. Similarly, centralisation is the norm, despite the presence of 
decentralising and federal provisions. Government organs across the board 
are largely immune to public scrutiny and accountability. 
Institutions and people: A major conclusion of the Study is that 
although the democratic institutions enjoy formal sanction in South Asia, 
this by itself has failed to ensure that they have come to develop deep 
roots in society. One implication of this conclusion is that representative 
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institutions have not only suffered from an erosion of autonomy, but 
also enjoy a low level of popular trust. This has left the space for non-
representative institutions to engage in signifi cant decision-making 
relating to governance. There is also an important paradox generated in this 
process. When these ‘non-representative’ institutions have successfully 
guarded and asserted their autonomy, they have tended to become less 
accountable to the people and are seen as refl ecting elite interests.
To what extent do people trust institutions of governance? In the 
broad South Asian context, institutions are a weak link in the democratic 
chain. Institutions also face serious criticism, but not all institutions 
enjoy low public trust. Yet, democratic institutions have managed to earn 
popular trust. The picture in South Asia is one of modestly robust trust 
in institutions.  There are country variations. Pakistan records the lowest 
trust in political institutions while Bangladesh has the highest. Meanwhile, 
religious and ethnic minorities are low on trust in institutions in both 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Party political competition: Political parties continue to be central to 
the political landscape of South Asia. They also refl ect and give expression 
to the high degree of societal diversity – religious, linguistic, ethnic – and 
extreme disparities between individuals and groups. Refl ecting these 
tensions, political parties have also assumed the character of coalitions. 
There is also a growing dissatisfaction with, and a lowering of trust in, 
the functioning of political parties. This has led to a paradoxical situation. 
People feel that the political parties are essential for the functioning of 
democracy, but do not seem to trust them for making democracy work. This 
lack of trust is paralleled with the fact that political parties have become 
election and patronage machines. The Survey enables two observations 
in this regard. Firstly, non-representative democratic institutions such 
as the Election Commission and the judiciary enjoy a higher public trust 
than political parties that are supposed to be representative institutions. 
Secondly, despite their lack of trust in them, South Asian citizens maintain 
a fairly high record of voting for the political parties at elections. 
Democracy beyond parties and elections: Dissatisfaction with 
electoral politics in South Asia has led to a search for new forms of civic 
activism. This non-party political process is both complementary to, and in 
contention with, the electoral political process. It has helped expand and 
deepen democracy. Paralleled to non-party forms of political activism is the 
growing salience of religious and militant mobilisations. They also refl ect 
deep infi rmities with the formal institutions of politics and governance.
Political  outcomes: The working of democracy in South Asia has 
resulted in more hope-generating ‘intangible’ political outcomes. The 
institutions of democracy have helped to empower former subjects into 
becoming fuller citizens, even though the substance of citizenship remains 
subject to contestation. The idea of democracy has introduced to South Asia 
the modern language of rights and helped provide an inclusive and dignifi ed 
space to hitherto excluded groups. In short, it has reshaped the normative 
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visions of people. At the same time, even as the practice of democracy has 
equipped citizens with new yardsticks of critical judgment, its failure to live 
up to its own standards remains a source of disappointment.  The inability 
to protect minority rights is one big failure of democracy in South Asia.
Futures: Far from being a secure possession, the quest for 
democracy is an on-going struggle. Thus, the Report identifi es three 
key challenges to democracy in South Asia: foundational challenges, 
challenges of expansion, and challenges of deepening. The future of the 
democratic enterprise of each South Asian country is intimately linked to 
the larger trajectories of social change and political transformation that are 
not confi ned within national borders. 
Part II
Sri Lanka Study: Background
In the Sri Lanka country study too, the methodology of four 
pathways was followed. There were three ‘Case Studies’ done in Sri Lanka. 
They are on (i) “Democracy, power and violence,” (ii) family and politics, 
and (iii) youth and democracy’s future. Themes of the case studies were 
chosen to explore some of the key paradoxes, or ‘inconvenient truths’, 
about the experience of democracy in each country. The Sri Lankan study 
had three ‘democracy dialogues’ to which political and social activists, 
students, trade union organisers, women activists and intellectuals were 
invited. Themes of the three democracy dialogues were “state of democracy 
in Sri Lanka,” “democracy: majorities and minorities,” and “democracy 
and human security.” The qualitative assessments addressed questions 
formulated around fi ve key themes: (i). the promise of democracy, (ii), 
design of democracy, (iii) working of democracy, (iv) democracy’s outcomes, 
and (v) democracy’s futures.       
The cross-section survey was conducted in the late 2004 and 
early 2005 in 75 out of 196 parliamentary constituencies in the country, 
covering all the nine provinces and 21 administrative districts. The 
number of constituencies per district was decided on the proportion of the 
population and the socio- political diversity of each district. In the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces, the survey was conducted only in the areas that 
at the time were under government control. Further, constituencies in the 
northern and eastern provinces were over-sampled in order to facilitate 
detailed analysis at the district level and within ethnic communities. A 
total of 6 polling booths were chosen from each selected constituency using 
the Simple Random Sampling (SRS) technique.  The latest voter lists were 
used as the sampling frame to select the respondents within a polling 
station and the selection was done using the SRS technique. A total of 
4600 interviews were conducted in 21 districts across the country while 
within each polling booth a total of 15 people were interviewed by the fi eld 
researchers. 
63
PCD Journal Vol. 1, No. 1 & 2
Studying and reporting on democracy in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s democracy offers a specifi c problematic. The country 
has a relatively long encounter with institutions and practices of liberal 
democracy. The universal franchise as well as partially representative 
government was established in Sri Lanka as far back as 1931, when the 
island was still under the British colonial rule. Sri Lanka’s institutions of 
electoral and parliamentary democracy continue to exist with only minor 
deviations along with a continuing civil war and amidst violence. Sri Lanka 
has not had successful attempts at extra-parliamentary rule. The only 
military coup attempt was made in 1962, but it could not take off the 
ground beyond the planning stage. This has led some commentators to 
argue that despite minor deviations, Sri Lanka’s democratic governance 
has been “resilient” (de Silva: 1998). However, as the political change in 
recent decades indicates, ‘democratic resilience’ does not capture the whole 
story of the post-colonial political change in Sri Lanka. There are at least 
two parallel developments along with the apparent institutionalisation 
and consolidation of parliamentary and electoral democracy. The fi rst is 
what some scholars have described in such terms as “institutional decay,” 
“political decay,” “illiberal democracy,” “retreat from democracy” and 
“constitutional authoritarianism.”1 
 The second parallel level of politics is that of the armed insurgency, 
rebellion, counter-insurgency warfare and violence.  Since the early 1970s, 
politics in Sri Lanka has been taking place at two levels -- fi rst at the level 
of legal, electoral and parliamentary practices and second, as counter-state 
mobilisation, armed rebellion and counter-insurgency war. Institutions of 
parliamentary democracy appear to have taken fi rm roots in the Sri Lankan 
society, as characterised by a comparatively long institutional history of 
modern democracy, high level of electoral participation, penetration of 
the political party system into all corners of the society, and the regular 
and peaceful change of regimes by means of elections. However, Sri 
Lanka has also produced twin counter-state insurgencies – one in the 
majority Sinhalese society and the other in the minority Tamil society. 
The concentration of the civil war process since the 1970s demonstrates 
a particular co-existence between two seemingly contradictory processes, 
parliamentary democracy and anti-state rebellions. The prevalence of 
counter-state insurgencies indicates that Sri Lanka’s democracy has 
had some serious limitations in addressing the substantial social and 
ethnic grievances. But, these systemic challenges do not yet seem to 
have precipitated any serious democracy reform endeavor. Sri Lanka’s 
democratic paradox is further highlighted by the remarkable resilience 
of state institutions to stay unreformed despite four decades of rebellion, 
protest and political violence. Counter-state armed rebellions have not 
led to political structural reforms, but to a culture of ‘reform resistance’ 
(Uyangoda:  2000)
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During the period in which the Survey was carried out, late 2004 
and early 2005, Sri Lanka had a backdrop of some signifi cant political 
developments. Key among them was the suspension of the internationally 
mediated peace negotiations between the government and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The peace talks, backed by a cease-fi re 
agreement between the government and the LTTE, intended to manage Sri 
Lanka’s civil war by means of a mutually acceptable political settlement. 
After six rounds of talks, the peace process that began in early 2002 came 
to a halt in early 2003. All attempts made by the international backers of 
the peace process to resume the talks had failed. However, the cease-fi re 
agreement monitored by a Nordic group of observers continued to hold 
preventing any early relapse to full-scale war. There was also a regime 
change occurred at the parliamentary elections held April in 2004, when 
the opposition United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) won the majority 
of parliamentary seats. The UPFA replaced the United National Front 
(UNF) government which had been engaging in a peace process with the 
LTTE.  In political and ideological terms, the new UPFA regime represented 
a Sinhalese nationalist coalition that was hostile to the internationally-
backed political engagement between the UNF government and the LTTE.
The Tsunami of 2004 occurred during the period of this study. The 
Tsunami was politically signifi cant in the sense that it opened up a new 
humanitarian window of opportunity for the new UPFA government and 
the LTTE to return to the negotiation table. In early 2005, the two sides 
established contacts and began negotiating a framework text for a joint 
post-tsunami reconstruction mechanism called Post-Tsunami Operational 
Management Structure (P-Toms). When in July 2005 the government and 
LTTE representatives signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 
order to set up this joint administrative structure, Sinhalese nationalist 
elements in the government challenged its constitutional validity before 
the Supreme Court. The Court in its judgment delivered in September 
2005 invalidated the P-TOMS.  This development was symptomatic of 
the intensity of the ethnic-nationalist atmosphere that existed during the 
period in which the cross-section survey was carried out in Sri Lanka.
The political economy context that existed in Sri Lanka during 2004-
2005 also had some signifi cant dimensions. Sri Lanka began economic 
liberalisation in 1977-1978, and was the fi rst South Asian country to move 
in the direction of free-market centric macro-economic reforms.  In the 
late 1980s, Sri Lanka also began to implement Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, thereby completing the agenda of economic liberalisation. 
Even the nationalist-Left coalition government that came to power in 1994 
and was in offi ce till the end of 2001 did not alter the basic framework 
of the liberalised economy. During the UNF-led peace process with the 
LTTE, there was a new policy emphasis on greater internationalisation of 
the Sri Lankan economy.  In fact, the UNF government appeared to think 
that the consequences of rapid economic growth, facilitated by economic 
incentives of peace and greater involvement of foreign capital and donor 
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assistance, would eventually weaken, and even make irrelevant, the 
militant Tamil project for secession. However, the UNF government’s project 
of internalisation of both the peace process and economic development 
politically backfi red. This background facilitated the emergence of a 
signifi cant social and political discontent towards the liberal economy. The 
new UPFA regime of 2004 to some extent embodied demands for returning 
to some measure of social welfarism and state involvement in protecting 
the vulnerable social groups, particularly the rural peasantry.  
 To return to Sri Lanka’s democracy problematic noted above, 
Sri Lanka can in a way be considered as an ‘old democracy.’ It has well-
established institutions of democratic governance, yet many of them do 
not seem to have the energy and vitality required for the deepening of 
democracy or constructively grappling with the country’s ethno-political 
civil war. The fact that the governments have often resorted to non-
political institutions – primarily the military – to deal with the ethnic 
confl ict as well as social discontent and that the state structures remain 
stubbornly unreformed refl ect how Sri Lankan democracy has assumed 
a conservative, or somewhat ‘aged’,  character. The actually existing 
democracy is the status quo that refuses to re-invigorate itself. Do citizens 
evaluate democracy in these terms, in a similar sense of disenchantment, 
often expressed in democracy dialogues and the qualitative assessments? 
Does the Survey tell the political critic and the activist that the vitality 
of democracy is not yet lost? The discussion in the following section will 
provide answers to these and similar questions.   
Democracy and Sri Lankan Citizens 
Understanding of Democracy
The Survey attempted to build a picture of how the citizens in 
Sri Lanka understood and related themselves to democracy. With that 
objective in mind, the Survey focused on the meanings, characteristics and 
attributes of democracy as people understood it. The following are some of 
the key fi ndings in relation to Sri Lanka.2
 (i). Meaning of democracy: People obviously understand democracy 
in a variety of ways. For the majority of Sri Lankan citizens, the two most 
important meanings of democracy are freedom (54%) and justice (28%). 
Popular rule, elections and the rule of law are of low priority as meanings 
of democracy. This understanding of democracy primarily as freedom and 
justice is shared almost equally by the rural as well as urban citizens and 
both men and women. In terms of social position too, whether elite or 
non-elite, this understanding of democracy remains without a signifi cant 
change. The only interesting change in the way democracy is understood is 
observable when ethnic minority communities attached a signifi cant value 
to ‘peace and security’ as meanings of democracy.  Over one third of North-
East Tamils and Up-Country Tamils – 37 and 36 percents respectively – 
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and over one-fourth of Muslims considered peace and security as important 
meanings of democracy as were freedom and justice. 
Another way in which the Survey attempted to understand how 
people relate themselves to democracy was to fi nd out what essential 
characteristics they attributed to democracy. Forty percent of Sri Lankans 
consider equal rights to be the “most essential element of democracy.” In fact, 
Sri Lankans consider equal rights, opportunity to change the government 
(19 %) and availability of basic necessities to all (17%) as democracy’s 
three most essential elements. Free speech and action (“everyone is free 
to speak and act”) is the attribute of democracy which most Sri Lankans, 
54%, like. Other attributes have much less support. For example, only 13% 
consider “people have control over their rulers” as the most liked attribute 
of democracy. The proposition that “interests of minorities are protected” 
has only 12% support, but it is still higher than the South Asian average 
of 6%. The statement that “democracy treats the weak with dignity” is seen 
as the most liked attribute of democracy in Bangladesh with 54% support, 
while among Sri Lankans it has only 7% support. These country variations 
refl ect the social conditions as well diverse aspirations that shape how 
citizens relate themselves to democracy.    
What is the most disliked attribute of democracy? Sri Lankan citizens 
seem to dislike three aspects of democracy: corruption, divisiveness and 
the ‘tyranny of the numerical majority.’ The largest group of respondents, 
49%, thinks that corruption increases under democracy. So do 35% of all 
the South Asians. The second attribute of democracy which Sri Lankans 
dislike most is that democracy divides people with too many political 
parties. This refl ects the negative assessment of the role of political parties. 
Sri Lanka’s history of political parties is over sixty years. Political parties 
have penetrated all corners of society not only as agencies of democratic 
mobilisation and participation, but also institutions of localised power 
and domination, patron-client relations, political corruption and at times 
violence. Thus, this skeptical assessment of political parties demonstrates 
a critical refl ection on the part of the citizens of their encounters with 
the institutions and agencies of democracy. They also refl ect some deep 
anxieties about the existing democracy. Obviously, the popular support 
for democracy does not seem to be unconditional.  Majoritarian democracy 
leading to tyranny of the numerical majority (“those who have more votes 
dominate over others”) is seen by 12 % as the most disliked aspect of 
democracy.
Sri Lanka’s preference for representative democracy is quite high 
as it is the case with Bangladesh, India and Nepal. 43% of Sri Lankans 
“strongly agree” and another 45% “agree” with the statement that “the 
country should be governed by those chosen by the people in a fair election.” 
The average South Asian fi gures are 48% “strongly agree” and 29% “agree.” 
In the Sri Lankan case, the highest support for representative democracy 
comes from ethnic/religious minorities, the urban areas and male voters. 
67
PCD Journal Vol. 1, No. 1 & 2
 (ii). Alternatives to Democracy: In assessing people’s attitudes 
towards democracy, the Survey explored how the Sri Lankan citizens 
see the alternatives to democracy. To the proposition that ‘dictatorship’ 
is a preferable alternative to democratic rule, 53% Sri Lankans said that 
democracy was preferable to dictatorship.’ Only 9 % have reported to 
prefer dictatorship over democracy. In the overall South Asian context, the 
percentage of Sri Lankans who prefer democracy is higher. The average 
South Asian fi gure is 42%. 
Meanwhile, the percentage of Sri Lankans who prefer dictatorship 
(9) is also slightly higher than the South Asian average of 7%. Interestingly, 
Sri Lanka’s preference for dictatorship equals Pakistan with 9% preference 
in each country, although Sri Lankans had not experienced a dictatorial 
rule. The corresponding ‘preference for dictatorship’ fi gures for Bangladesh, 
India and Nepal are 6% each. Meanwhile, 13% Sri Lankans say that 
democracy or dictatorship makes no difference to them, while 25% had no 
opinion on this choice. There are two ways to interpret this data. On one 
hand, on the question of a choice between democracy and dictatorship, 
Sri Lankan data offers a somewhat unsettling picture. On the other hand, 
it is probably a minor desire for something the citizens had never directly 
encountered. The consolation for the well-wishers of Sri Lankan democracy 
is that Sri Lanka has the lowest fi gure for those for whom democracy 
or dictatorship makes no difference, In Pakistan, which has seen long-
surviving military-authoritarian regimes, dictatorship makes no difference 
to 32% of people, which is the highest in South Asia. Even for India, the 
corresponding fi gure is slightly higher than for Sri Lanka (14%). 
Among the alternatives to democracy that the voters were asked 
to state their preference was monarchy, military rule and a system of 
governance where religious leaders make major decisions. Only a very 
small number of Sri Lankan preferred monarchy, with only 4% ‘strongly 
agreeing” and 17% ‘agreeing.’ In Nepal where a monarchy had actually 
existed when this study was carried out, the support for monarchy was 
less than half, with 19% ‘strongly agreeing’ and 26% ‘agreeing.’ Meanwhile, 
Sri Lanka showed more support for ‘rule by strong leader.’ Preference for 
strong leader was 62%, which was higher than the average South Asian 
fi gure of 50%. Sri Lanka’s was the second highest preference for ‘rule by 
strong leader’ with Nepal recording almost similar preference with 63%. 
However, Sri Lanka’s preference for army rule and religious leaders was 
comparatively low. Only 23% of Sri Lankans, compared with the South 
Asian average of 32%, preferred the army rule. The percentage of Sri 
Lankans disagreed with the preference for army rule was 63%, which 
was the highest in South Asia. This stood in sharp contrast with both 
Bangladesh and Pakistan where 50% and 49% preferred the army rule. 
Sri Lanka’s preference for ‘religious leaders taking major decisions’ was 
also low, with only 21% support, whereas those who disagreed with that 
proposition was as high as 57%. The average South Asian support for 
religious leaders to take major policy decisions was also low with 17%, 
with half of the South Asians, 50% disagreeing. 
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Sri Lanka’s low preference for the proposition that ‘religious leaders 
should take major decisions’ has had a noteworthy contextual dimension. 
In 2004, during the latter part of which the cross-section survey was carried 
out, a new Sinhalese-Buddhist political party had stormed the electoral 
and parliamentary arena. Known as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU – 
National Heritage Party), this new political entity fi elded over 200 Buddhist 
monks as candidates at the parliamentary election held in April 2004. Nine 
of them were elected as MPs. Their main message to the electorate had two 
key ideas: they were there as professional politicians and MPs to protect 
the interests of the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority community and they were 
committed to restoring the morality in public affairs. The campaign of the 
JHU on these two counts does not seem to have convinced the electorate in 
any major way. What it perhaps indicates is that the Sri Lankan electorate 
is essentially secular as is the South Asian electorate in general.
Meanwhile, the picture of the depth of support for democracy in 
Sri Lanka, as it is the case in South Asia, is somewhat complex one as 
refl ected in the Survey.  ‘Strong’ and ‘weak’ democrats together outnumber 
the ‘non-democrats,’ yet the overall picture for the support for democracy 
is a moderate one.  The SDSA Report measured the support for democratic 
government in South Asia through a three-fold typology of ‘strong 
democrats,’ ‘weak-democrats’ and ‘non-democrats.’
Strong Democrats are those who support democratic government 
by elected representatives while strongly rejecting non-democratic 
alternatives.  Non-democrats are those who prefer dictatorship OR for 
whom democracy and dictatorship does not matter AND support the army 
rule or monarchy OR strongly reject the rule by elected representatives. 
Further, they accept unambiguous forms of non-democratic rule. The 
individuals who neither fall into the strong democrats nor non-democrats 
are defi ned as weak democrats or ambivalent democrats.  Weak democrats 
do not fi t into either of the above two categories. However, they are closer 
to democrats than to non-democrats.  
Although this typology is based on a somewhat narrow defi nition 
of democracy – ‘rule by elected representatives --, it still provides a useful 
glimpse into how committed the citizens are to democratic government as 
opposed to its alternatives. Sri Lanka’s strong democrats are 36%, weak 
democrats are 50%, and non-democrats 14%.  An optimistic interpretation 
of this data is that among Sri Lankans, the share of ‘strong democrats’ 
is twice as mush as ‘non-democrats.’ The Sri Lankan fi gure of ‘strong 
democrats’ is higher than the corresponding fi gure for South Asia (26%), 
although it is lower than Latin America (43%).      However, the cause for 
concern is the fact that half of the Sri Lankans falls into the category of 
‘weak democrats.’ 3 
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Satisfaction with democracy
Asked to indicate how satisfi ed they were with the way democracy 
worked in the country, 42% of Sri Lankans recorded satisfaction, with 4% 
being ‘very satisfi ed’ and 38% ‘satisfi ed.’ The corresponding South Asian 
overall fi gure differs only marginally, with 43 both ‘very satisfi ed’ and 
‘satisfi ed.’ Somewhat paradoxically, the highest fi gures for the satisfaction 
with democracy were reported from Bangladesh where military rule had 
replaced democratic governments a number of times and democracy had 
not addressed many of the socio-economic problems. There, 21% were 
‘very satisfi ed’ with democracy and 32 percent ‘satisfi ed.’
As the following table indicates, the data on the satisfaction with 
democracy indicates interesting variations. The most surprising observation 
is that ethnic minorities show greater satisfaction with democracy. 
The Tamil and Muslim minority communities are more satisfi ed with 
democracy than the Sinhalese majority. The Up Country Tamil community 
has expressed the least satisfaction.4 The data on dissatisfaction with 
democracy shows another side of the satisfaction problematic. The highest 
among the dissatisfi ed with democracy are also Tamils. This outcome 
is quite understandable in the context of Sri Lanka’s protracted ethno-
political civil war and the Tamil grievance that they have not been given 
their due political rights. As we noted earlier in the paper, one of the 
greatest failures of democracy in South Asia is in the area of minority 
rights.  An issue that warrants further inquiry and study is refl ected in the 
anomaly that can be observed between the level of satisfaction (45.4%) and 
dissatisfaction (37.3%) with democracy among the Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
The question in this regard is about explaining why more Tamils, who 
have been at the receiving end of Sri Lanka’s majoritarian democracy, are 
satisfi ed with democracy while a lesser percentage is dissatisfi ed.
Table 1. Satisfaction with democracy by ethnicity, age, 
gender, locality, and education.
SATISFIED DISSATISFIED NO OPINION TOTAL % BASE (N)
ETHNICITY
Sinhala 42.3% 35.4% 22.3% 100% 3312
Tamil 45.4% 37.3% 17.2% 100% 506
Muslim 51.4% 21% 27% 100% 500
UC-Tamil 38.2% 23.5% 38.2% 100% 157
AGE
18 – 30 49.5% 37.1% 13.5% 100% 1071
31 – 40 45.8% 34% 20.2% 100% 839
41 – 50 43.8% 33.1% 23.1% 100% 781
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51 – 60 41.7% 33.6% 24.7% 100% 608
60 + 31.4% 26.8% 41.9% 100% 422
GENDER
Male 44.9% 40.2% 15% 100% 2120
Female 42.5% 27.5% 29.8% 100% 2496
LOCALITY
Rural 42.9% 33.1% 24.0% 100% 4028
Urban 48.0% 35.9% 10.2% 100% 588
EDUCATION
Non-Literate 17.0% 10.5% 72.5% 100% 229
Below Primary 36.3% 19.3% 44.4% 100% 856
Below O/L 48.0% 35.6% 16.4% 100% 2737
O/L and A/L 46.2% 47.7% 6.1% 100% 660
Graduate and 
above 37.6%
60.0% 2.4% 100% 85
Young Sri Lankans are more satisfi ed than dissatisfi ed with the 
way democracy has worked in the country. Interestingly, the satisfaction 
as well as the dissatisfaction fi gures gradually decline with older people. 
Similarly, the inability to make an opinion whether satisfi ed or not with the 
way democracy works in Sri Lanka also increases with age. The satisfaction 
with democracy does not differ signifi cantly according to gender, yet the 
Survey shows that Sri Lankan men were more dissatisfi ed than women 
with democracy. Whether one lived in a rural area or urban area does not 
seem to infl uence the citizen’s assessment of the way in which democracy 
has worked. But, there is a greater dissatisfaction with the working of 
democracy among the elites with higher levels of education and wealth.
Can citizens infl uence those who rule?
Most Sri Lankan citizens seem to believe that their vote does count 
in infl uencing those who rule the country. As the ‘effi cacy of democracy’ 
table shows below, there are interesting variations in this regard in terms 
of ethnicity and education.
When asked whether their vote counted, a three fourth of the Up 
Country Tamil community and 70% of the Sinhalese community stated 
that their vote had an effect.  However, minority Tamils and Muslims did 
not seem to believe that they could infl uence the regime through their 
ballot. The Tamils and Muslims who affi rmed that their vote made a 
difference were less than fi fty percent, a signifi cantly low fi gure compared 
with the Sinhalese and Up Country Tamils. Close to one third of Tamil 
and Muslim citizens stated that their vote did not make any difference in 
the way politics worked in the country whereas the number of Sinhalese 
and Up Country Tamils who thought so was less than twenty percent. 
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This variation in terms of the ethnic community on effi cacy of democracy 
requires further analysis and study. A hypothesis worth examining in this 
regard is that a community’s assessment of the effi cacy of democracy is 
shaped by its relationship with the state.  
Table 2. Effi cacy of Democracy by Ethnicity, Age, 
Gender, Locality and Education
MAKE NO 
DIFFERENCE HAS AN EFFECT NO OPINION TOTAL % BASE (N)
ETHNICITY
Sinhala 18.2% 71.3% 10.5% 100% 3312
Tamil 31.2% 48.4% 20.4% 100% 506
Muslim 33% 51.8% 15.2% 100% 500
UC-Tamil 14% 75.2% 10.8% 100% 157
AGE
18 – 30 21.5% 69.1% 9.4% 100% 1071
31 – 40 22.5% 66.7% 10.8% 100% 839
41 – 50 18.9% 71.4% 9.7% 100% 781
51 – 60 20.4% 67.6% 12% 100% 608
60 + 22% 53.4% 24.7% 100% 422
GENDER
Male 19.2% 72.5% 8.3% 100% 2120
Female 22.6% 61.5% 15.9% 100% 2496
LOCALITY
Rural 19.9% 67.7% 12.4% 100% 4028
Urban 29.3% 58.5% 12.2% 100% 588
EDUCATION
Non-Literate 22.3% 40.6% 37.1% 100% 229
Below Primary 23.5% 58.3% 18.2% 100% 856
Below O/L 21.0% 68.6% 10.4% 100% 2737
O/L and A/L 18.2% 77.1% 4.7% 100% 660
Graduate and 
above 16.5% 80.0% 3.5% 100%
85
Educational level seems to be another signifi cant factor in 
determining the voters’ belief in the effi cacy of democracy.  The table above 
supports the proposition that the higher the education level, the greater 
is the belief in the effi cacy of democracy. Greater numbers of educated 
people who have passed Ordinary Levels, Advanced Levels, and university 
degrees than their less educated counterparts believed that their vote did 
matter. Meanwhile, an interesting point that emerges in a further analysis 
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of the data is that there is no relationship between the satisfaction of 
the way democracy worked and the belief in the effi cacy of democracy. 
It also suggests that satisfaction with democracy does not necessarily 
make a citizen a strong democrat. Strong democrats are satisfi ed with 
the way democracy worked in the country, but those who are satisfi ed 
with democracy are not automatically strong democrats. To be a strong 
democrat, one has to be more than a believer in the effi cacy of democracy; 
one has to reject all the alternatives to democracy as well.  
Conclusions
Going along with the general South Asian tendency, the Sri Lankan 
citizens seem to have appropriated the European, liberal conception of 
democracy with a greater emphasis in its meaning on the substantive, 
rather than procedural, dimensions. Freedom, justice and welfare, and 
peace and security are the three most important meanings which the vast 
majority of Sri Lankan respondents of the survey have indicted as the 
meaning of democracy. Procedural aspects of democracy are relevant, but 
not crucial to making sense of democracy for most of the people in Sri 
Lanka. In the overall South Asian regional picture, procedural dimensions 
have a greater salience than in Sri Lanka.
Those who claim to be the greatest supporters of democracy are 
the educated and elite sections of society. Citizens of the lower levels of 
educational and economic achievements seem to be both critical and open 
about what democracy has actually meant to them. So are the women. Men 
in Sri Lanka claim to be greater enthusiasts of democracy than women. 
The greatest skeptics of democracy in Sri Lanka, as indicated in the 
survey, are the older people, with greater exposure to democracy and its 
disappointments as well. When citizens grow older, they seem to develop a 
critical assessment of democracy whereas the young display a less critical 
approach.
Sri Lankans in general seem to be quite weary of the alternatives 
to democracy. There is very little support for non-democratic alternatives 
to the existing forms of democratic governance despite the infi rmities of 
the latter. However, there is also cause for concern.  Nearly a quarter of 
Sri Lankans prefer army rule and the most support for army rule comes 
from the Buddhists. There is also an overwhelming support in Sri Lanka 
for ‘rule by strong leader,’ despite Sri Lanka’s experience since the 1980s 
of constitutional authoritarianism built around the powerful offi ce of 
the President. On the question of the commitment to the rule by elected 
representatives, one-half of Sri Lankans are ‘weak democrats.’
A fi rst reading of the survey results does not suggest any major 
surprises about the attitudes and perceptions of Sri Lankan people’s towards 
democracy. A detailed reading may indicate complexities, anomalies and 
nuances. Some questions that emerge from this broad account warrant 
deeper examination. For example, why is it that ethnic minorities show 
greater satisfaction with democracy when the Sri Lankan democracy has 
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so far failed to address their political grievances? Why do more men than 
women appear to value democracy? Why do more young citizens than their 
older counterparts believe in the effi cacy of democracy? Who are the ‘weak 
democrats’ and why are they ‘weak democrats’? Is Sri Lankan democracy 
secular? We seek to examine these and similar questions in depth in 
another essay.  
Endnotes
1  For the ‘crisis’ literature on Sri Lanka’s recent politics see Manor: 1984, Tambiah: 
1986, Moore: 1992, Coomaraswamy: 1996, Senaratne: 1997, Krishna: 1999,  De 
Votta: 2002 and 2003.
2  All the survey data cited on Sri Lanka in this paper are from SDSA Report: 2008.
3  The notion of ‘weak democrats’ in Sri Lanka needs to be further explored in 
relation to both survey data and qualitative research. We intend to do so in our 
future work.
4  Up Country Tamils are a distinct minority community in Sri Lanka who differs 
from the Tamil community living elsewhere in Sri Lanka. As the name suggest, 
the Up Country Tamils live in the central Hill Country, primarily as workers in the 
tea plantations. They were brought to Sri Lanka by the British in the late 19th and 
the early 20th centuries from Southern India as indentured labour. After decades 
of struggle, almost all of them have now got citizenship rights, but they continue 
to live in poverty and marginalisation. However, they have representation in the 
Cabinet, national parliament and provincial and local bodies.
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